The Death Penalty in the Nineties:  An Examination of the Modern System of Capital Punishment by Shaevsky, Thomas L.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 90 Issue 6 
1992 
The Death Penalty in the Nineties: An Examination of the Modern 
System of Capital Punishment 
Thomas L. Shaevsky 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas L. Shaevsky, The Death Penalty in the Nineties: An Examination of the Modern System of Capital 
Punishment, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1689 (1992). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol90/iss6/38 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. By Welsh s. White. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1991. Pp. 223. Cloth, 
$34.50; paper, $17.95. 
During the 1990-1991 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ten-
nessee v. Payne 1 that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a pros-
ecutor from arguing, nor a capital sentencing jury from considering, 
victim impact evidence concerning the victim's personal characteris-
tics and the emotional impact of the murder on the victim's family. 
During the same Term, in McCleskey v. Zant, 2 the Court limited a 
prisoner's right to file a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus if 
the petition contains a claim presented for the first time. 
While these cases are too recent to be included in Professor Welsh 
S. White's book, The Death Penalty in the Nineties: An Examination 
of the Modem System of Capital Punishment, 3 they arguably reinforce 
White's two major themes. First, White emphasizes the continuing 
arbitrariness of the death penalty's application. He declares that 
"[t]he death penalty is arbitrarily imposed if it is imposed on the basis 
of factors that have no relationship to either the crime committed or 
the character of the offender" (p. 157). Under this analysis, the Payne 
decision, by allowing increased attention on the victim rather than on 
the offender, appears to contribute to continuing arbitrariness. Sec-
ond, despite such arbitrariness, the Supreme Court is placing greater 
priority on expeditious executions at the cost of a criminal defendant's 
Eighth Amendment guarantee (pp. 8-23). Under White's rubric, the 
Zant decision represents another step in this direction. 4 
According to White, the arbitrary application of the death penalty 
1. 111 s. Ct. 2597 (1991). 
2. 111 s. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
3. Welsh S. White is Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. Professor White is the 
author of THE DEATH PENALTY JN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYS-
TEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987) and LIFE JN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
IN CAPITAL CASES (1984). 
In the introduction to The Death Penalty in the Nineties, White notes that his latest book 
differs from his earlier work, The Death Penalty in the Eighties, primarily due to the addition of 
two chapters: one discussing the Supreme Court's monitoring of the capital punishment system 
and the other discussing which convicted murderers are most likely to receive the death penalty. 
P. I. 
4. In arguing that the Supreme Court has placed a higher priority on the smooth function of 
the capital punishment system than on protecting capital defendants' rights, White relies on 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). In Sykes, the Supreme Court limited a defendant's 
ability to allege a constitutional claim in a federal habeas corpus petition when he has failed to 
raise that same claim in the appropriate manner in the state courts. P. 16. In Zant, the Court 
adopted the Sykes standard as the same standard limiting a defendant's ability to present a claim 
for the first time in a second habeas corpus petition. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at 1470. 
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continues today despite the Supreme Court's pronouncements in 
Furman v. Georgia 5 and Gregg v. Georgia 6 regarding the unconstitu-
tionality of arbitrary capital punishment procedures. As an example, 
White points to the Baldus study that concluded the killer of a white 
victim is more likely to receive the death penalty than the killer of a 
nonwhite victim (p. 150). InMcCleskey v. Kemp,1 the Supreme Court 
stated that even though race might play a role in the criminal justice 
system, racial discrepancies revealed in the Baldus study fall short of 
the procedural defects identified in Furman (p. 158). Contrarily, 
White argues that because the victim's race has nothing to do with the 
nature of the crime or the character of the offender, taking such a 
factor into account results in arbitrariness (p. 157). A victim's race 
"has no more relevance to the nature of the crime or the character of 
the offender than the color of the defendant's eyes or the day of the 
week on which the crime was committed" (p. 157). One can surmise 
from White's analysis that allowing a capital sentencing jury to con-
sider victim impact statements would result in arbitrariness as it 
would focus the jury's attention on the victim rather than on the na-
ture of the crime or the character of the offender. Nonetheless, in 
Payne, the Supreme Court stated that a victim impact statement in-
forms the sentencing authority of the harm caused by the convicted 
defendant and that such harm is an appropriate factor in determining 
punishment. s 
Unfortunately, some of White's arguments supporting the death 
penalty's continuing arbitrary application appear as masked attacks on 
the entire criminal justice system. One may assume that the entire 
criminal justice system is not perfect because it contains elements of 
arbitrariness. It naturally follows that the death penalty will have 
some of these unfortunate elements as well. Yet, White singles out the 
arbitrariness of capital punishment as if it is the only worm in the 
apple. For example, White asserts that court-appointed attorneys are 
often inexperienced, and as a result the indigent defendant will more 
5. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, struck down as 
unconstitutional the then-existing capital punishment system. As each Justice issued an opinion, 
there was no one opinion of the Court. Nonetheless, it has been commonly agreed that the 
decisive ground of the Furman ruling "was that, out of a large number of persons 'eligible' in law 
for the punishment of death, a few were selected as if at random, by no stated (or perhaps &tat-
able) criteria, while all the rest suffered the lesser penalty of imprisonment." CHARLES BLACK, 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MI5I'AKE 20 (1981). 
6. The plurality in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976), read Furman as requiring 
that the decision to impose the death penalty "be guided by standards so that the sentencing 
authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant." Be-
cause Georgia's death penalty statute provided for a bifurcated proceeding in which the sentenc-
ing authority was provided with standards to guide its use of the information relevant to 
imposing the sentence, the death penalty statute was upheld. 
7. 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987). 
8. 111 s. Ct. 2597, 2606 (1991). 
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likely be sentenced to death.9 However, inexperienced court-ap-
pointed attorneys will increase the chances of a defendant being con-
victed of any crime. Perhaps the answer lies not with abolishing the 
death penalty but with revising the system of court-appointed 
attorneys. 
White's discussion of plea bargaining provides another example of 
a masked attack on the criminal justice system. White contends that a 
prosecutor's willingness to enter into plea bargaining discussions in a 
capital case is affected by factors unrelated to the nature of the crime 
committed or the strength of the evidence against the defendant (p. 
62). Instead, factors such as whether the prosecutor is seeking reelec-
tion, the location of the crime, and the funds available to the prosecu-
tor to prosecute the case influence the prosecutor's decision to extend 
a plea bargain invitation to the capital defendant (p. 55). Yet, such 
factors may influence a prosecutor's decision whether to plea bargain 
in any criminal case. White also argues that, even if offered a plea 
bargain, a defendant may reject it because he distrusts his attorney 
who encourages acceptance of the offer or because the defendant be-
lieves a jury verdict will be more favorable than the plea bargain offer. 
Thus, the ones who receive the death penalty are more likely to be less 
culpable than the ones who plea bargain (p. 61). Accepting White's 
assertion as valid, the same can be said for any defendant charged with 
any crime who declines a plea bargain invitation. Thus, although 
White's assertions may be evidence of the arbitrariness of the entire 
criminal justice system, abolishing capital punishment will not resolve 
these systemic problems. He could have responded as one commenta-
tor does by saying that even though the entire criminal justice system 
may contain elements of arbitrariness, such arbitrary elements are 
much more severe with capital punishment due to its permanence.10 
White also does not raise and discuss an interesting premise pro-
9. P. 37. Considerable time and money is required for defense counsel to discover and pres-
ent mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase. Such presentation depends on the attor-
ney's ability to understand the d;Ynamics of the death penalty trial. Pp. 76, 91. 
10. See BLACK, supra note 5, at 39 (our legal system has accepted "the specialness of death 
and the appropriateness of requiring, for death, more careful procedures than for any lesser 
punishment"). Dr. Ernest van den Haag, a death penalty proponent, responds to Black by say-
ing: "In the application of any law some capriciousness is unavoidable. If this were to make 
laws unconstitutional, we would have to do without laws, indeed, without the Constitution, for it 
too is unavoidably applied capriciously." ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, THE DEATH PENALTY: A 
DEBATE 206 (1983). Supreme Court justices have made similar observations: 
Petitioner's argument that there is an unconstitutional amount of discretion in the system 
which separates those suspects who receive the death penalty from those who receive life 
imprisonment, a lesser penalty, or are acquitted or never charged, seems to be in final analy-
sis an indictment of our entire system of justice .... I decline to interfere with the manner in 
which Georgia has chosen to enforce [the death penalty] on what is simply an assertion of 
lack of faith in the ability of the system of justice to operate in a fundamentally fair manner. 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 225-26 (1976) (White, J., concurring); see also McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 (1987) ("The Eighth Amendment is not limited in application to capi-
tal punishment, but applies to all penalties. Thus, if we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial 
bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with simi-
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posed by one death penalty proponent - Dr. Ernest van den Haag. 
Van den Haag initially makes his point in a non-death penalty context. 
He argues that selecting only bearded speeders for ticketing while al-
lowing the clean-shaven to escape is not unjust; what is unjust is the 
escape of the clean-shaven. To restate it in a more relevant context: 
"No murderer becomes less guilty, or less deserving of punishment, 
because another murderer was punished leniently, or escaped punish-
ment altogether .... A group of murderers does not become less de-
serving of punishment because another equally guilty group is not 
punished, or punished less."11 Thus, the distribution of punishment is 
offensive because some of those who deserved the death penalty did 
not receive it, not because some who deserved it did receive it. 
Perhaps one can argue van den Haag's assertion is not constitu-
tionally relevant. The Supreme Court seemed to say in Furman that 
the death penalty is unconstitutionally administered when certain con-
victed defendants receive it as if by random chance.12 The constitu-
tional concern seems to be that of selective punishment: the courts 
focus on why a convicted defendant was sentenced to death rather 
than focus on why a convicted defendant was not sentenced to death. 
Although van den Haag proposes an interesting philosophical argu-
ment, it may not exist as a constitutionally relevant inquiry because it 
may ignore the ruling in Furman. A book analyzing the death penalty 
almost seems incomplete without raising this particular assertion by 
van den Haag and then, perhaps, refuting it in a manner suggested 
above: 
In addition to arguing the death penalty's continuing arbitrary ap-
plication, White suggests that the Supreme Court is now more inter-
ested in the smooth functioning of the capital punishment system than 
in protecting the rights of capital defendants (p. 207). He argues that 
Lockhart v. McCree, 13 in which the Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment does not prohibit prosecutors and defense attorneys from 
asking prospective jurors about their attitudes toward the death pen-
alty during voir dire in capital cases, exemplifies the Court's new pri-
ority (p. 207). White cites studies that suggest a pro-death penalty 
Jar claims as to other types of penalty.") (citations omitted). But other commentators have taken 
issue with this analysis: 
[T]hough death is the most severe punishment in our legal system, it appears to be unneces-
sary for protecting citizens, while punishments generally are thought to promote our safety 
and well-being ..•• Most of us believe that if all punishments were abolished, there would be 
social chaos . • • • Hence, even though the system is not a just one, we believe that we must 
live with it and strive to make it as fair as possible. On the other hand, if we abolish capital 
punishment, there is reason to believe that nothing will happen. 
Stephen Nathanson, Does It Matter if Death Penalty Is Arbitrarily Administered?, 14 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 149, 162 (1985). 
11. Ernest van den Haag, Refuting Reiman and Nathanson, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 165, 174 
(1985). 
12. See supra note 5. 
13. 476 U.S. 162 (1986). 
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jury will give less protection to a defendant during the guilt trial; for 
example, a death-qualified jury (one in which no juror is opposed to 
the death penalty on principle) may be more likely to convict a defend-
ant (pp. 191-92). Yet, as White states, because the Court is reluctant 
to take action that would temporarily frustrate the operation of the 
capital punishment system, the Court went out of its way to decide 
that a death-qualified jury does not offend the Sixth Amendment (p. 
207). 
White discusses other recent Supreme Court cases to support his 
contention that capital punishment jurisprudence is now engaged in 
what he calls Phase II - a period begun in 1983 in which the Supreme 
Court started promoting expeditious executions.14 Phase I, by con-
trast, was the period from 1976 until 1983, in which the Court defined 
protections for the defendant (p. 5). However, by declaring the exist-
ence of two distinct and perhaps somewhat divergent phases of 
Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence, White does not seem to 
have contemplated that perhaps Phase II is merely an extension of 
Phase I. Expediting executions may promote a prisoner's Eighth 
Amendment rights. As one opponent of the death penalty has noted: 
"It would be an obvious violation of the letter and the spirit of the 
eighth amendment to keep prisoners under a sentence of death for 
many years, even decades, with only the slightest probability that they 
will ever be executed."15 This quotation suggests that White's conten-
tion that an emphasis on expediting executions results in a deemphasis 
on a convicted murderer's constitutional rights (pp. 11, 21) may not 
always be correct. 
In addition to l:µs two themes criticizing current death penalty ap-
plication, White discusses propositions and tactics of interest to practi-
tioners. Defense attorneys reading his book will find Chapter Four 
particularly helpful, as it suggests death penalty trial strategies for 
them. For example, White recommends provoking jury empathy for 
14. P. 8. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 
U.S. 299 (1990). In Barefoot, the Supreme Court allowed appellate courts to adopt summary 
procedures in death penalty cases such as deciding the merits of an appeal together with the 
application for a stay. The Court declared that capital defendants do not have a right to use 
habeas corpus to delay executions indefinitely. 463 U.S. at 887. The statute at issue in Blystone 
stated that the capital sentencing jury must choose the death sentence if it finds at least one 
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances. The defendant argued that the re-
quirement of individualized sentencing signifies that a jury must be allowed to determine whether 
the aggravating circumstances are sufficiently serious to warrant the death penalty. The Court 
stated that allowing the sentencing jury to consider mitigating evidence satisfies the Eighth 
Amendment's individualized sentencing requirement. 494 U.S. at 307. White says that "[t]he 
tone of the Court's opinion exemplifies its present approach to capital punishment issues. 
Although Blystone was a five·to-four decision, the majority made no effort to elaborate the basis 
for its decision ..•. The majority's tone was curt, conclusory, and final." P. 13. 
15. Victor L. Streib, Executions Under The Post-Capital Punishment Statutes: The Halting 
Progression From "Let's Do It" to "Hey, There Ain't No Point In Pulling So Tight," 15 RUTGERS 
L.J. 443, 487 (1984). 
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the defendant and having the defendant express his remorse at mur-
dering human beings (p. 87). Unfortunately for prosecutors, he only 
offers advice for the defense; nonetheless, a prosecutor can discover 
what tactics a defense attorney might employ at a death penalty trial. 
White's discussion is also presented from the defense side as he de-
votes much more analysis to the types of mitigating evidence a defense 
attorney can present during the penalty trial (Chapter Five) than to 
the types of aggravating evidence a prosecutor can present. White 
notes that although a defendant has broad rights to present mitigating 
evidence at a penalty trial, 16 the constitutional limits are not so clear 
(p. 108). Because of the unclear constitutional restraints, he suggests 
that states can limit the type of mitigating evidence the defendant can 
present, such as preventing the disclosure of lie detector test results 
and prohibiting arguments about the appropriateness of the death pen-
alty in general (pp. 108-09). 
A prosecutor also may be unhappy with White's recommendation 
that courts should impose a more rigorous restraint on a prosecutor's 
closing argument at the death penalty trial than on a defense attor-
ney's closing argument (p. 113). White suggests courts should limit a 
prosecutor to commenting on mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances in the case at hand and on how a jury is to weigh these circum-
stances; courts should prohibit a prosecutor from appealing to 
emotions during the closing argument, such as arguments that arouse 
a jury's fear of the defendant. 17 A jury's weighing of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, as required by statute, is to ensure that the 
jury will condemn only those capital felons the legislature considered 
the most heinous; a closing argument that diverts the jury's weighing 
of such circumstances undermines the goal of obtaining an even-
handed application of the death penalty (p. 121). By contrast, a de-
fense attorney, whose role is to argue for mercy, should have more 
leeway in arguing emotions to the jury. White predicts his suggestions 
will lead to an objective determination and weighing of the circum-
stances by the jury (p. 120). A prosecutor can breathe a sigh of relief, 
though, as White acknowledges that the Supreme Court is unlikely to 
adopt his recommendations (p. 121). 
White also presents an intriguing exploration of convicted defend-
ants who actually desire the death penalty (Chapter Eight). He gives 
illustrations of convicted murderers who desire execution in order to 
preserve their macho image (p. 177). Alarmingly, White proposes that 
individuals might commit murder in the first instance in order to re-
16. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
17. Pp. 120-21. White bases these suggestions on his reading of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 
U.S. 320 (1985). In Caldwell, the Court held it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment for a 
prosecutor to tell the jury that its decision was automatically reviewable by the state supreme 
court; this is because such a statement diminishes the jury's sense of responsibility and misleads a 
jury into believing appellate review is less limited than it actually is. 
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ceive the death penalty (pp. 178-79). Under such a scenario, the death 
penalty may be a less effective deterrent than life in prison. He warns, 
though, that a convicted murderer who says he prefers the death pen-
alty does not mean he preferred it before he committed the crime (p. 
180); thus, there is no accurate way of determining the deterrence ef-
fect of capital punishment in such situations (p. 179). Nonetheless, 
White's hypothesis that capital punishment is a less effective deterrent 
in such circumstances is something death penalty proponents do not 
consider.18 
By interviewing various defense attorneys, White reports tactics 
that defense attorneys who are personally opposed to capital punish-
ment employ to change their clients' insistence on seeking the death 
penalty. By developing a close rapport with a client, some defense 
attorneys are able to change a client's mind (p. 166). White discusses 
how one attorney, when faced with a client who insists on accepting 
execution, persuades the client to change his decision by suggesting 
the effect the execution will have on his family members (p. 166). 
Shockingly, some defense attorneys will attempt to change a client's 
mind by saying that confinement in the general prison population of-
fers a better chance for escape than on death row (p. 167). One attor-
ney tells alcoholic clients that alcohol can be obtained through illegal 
sources in the general prison population but not on death row (p. 167). 
Another attorney, who is also a law school professor, completely ig-
nores a client's wish to seek the death penalty; the client's wish is un-
important to the attorney because he believes that capital punishment 
is immoral (p. 168). Even when a client tells the professor not to pres-
ent mitigating evidence or not to appeal a death penalty sentence, the 
professor responds that the state law requires him to do so; yet, the 
professor admits to White that the state law is unclear on these mat-
ters so his representations to his client may be incorrect (p. 168). 
These stories are all appalling and require strong condemnation. 
However, White does not explicitly criticize the attorneys who en-
courage their clients to break the law nor does he state that the proper 
forum for the law school professor to express his personal opposition 
to death penalty is the state legislature. White also neglects to men-
tion that the professor's questionable behavior unnecessarily clogs the 
criminal justice system as the professor insists on adjudicating meas-
ures for his own pleasure rather than fulfilling his client's needs and 
desires. 
Although White quotes the relevant section of the ABA Code as 
declaring that "the lawyer should always remember that the decision 
whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of 
18. P. 179. White notes that this proposition may undermine van den Haag's incessant advo-
cacy of the death penalty's deterrence factor. P. 179. 
1696 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1689 
non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself,"19 
White states that the ethical guidelines do not specifically identify the 
decision to seek the death penalty as one to which the defendant has 
ultimate authority (p. 166). Eventually, White states that protecting a 
capital defendant's individual autonomy is an important consideration 
(p. 171). Thus, only implicitly and using the weakest possible lan-
guage does White disapprove of the attorneys' behavior he vividly de-
scribes. Such questionable defense counsel behavior deserves much 
more analysis of potential violations of ethical {and even criminal) 
codes. Otherwise, in the absence of strong condemnation of such 
deplorable activity, defense attorneys reading such accounts may not 
feel any remorse at trying such controversial techniques themselves. 
Intriguing as White's analysis is of why defendants desire the death 
penalty, other commentators also have suggested and analyzed this 
phenomenon. 20 Additional themes that White discusses similarly have 
been analyzed by other commentators. 21 Rather than viewing The 
Death Penalty in the Nineties as a book full of original, thought-pro-
voking ideas, one can view White's book as a collection of sources 
illustrating the vices of the death penalty. White supplements his sum-
mary of the works of others with lively and descriptive case studies 
which maintain the reader's attention, and he gives his own analysis of 
some Supreme Court decisions22 as well as recommendations on death 
penalty trial tactics for defense attorneys (Chapter Four). At first 
glance, White's book can be viewed as an introduction to the vices of 
the death penalty; however, it lacks too many arguments and counter-
arguments to be considered a comprehensive work. 
Most unfortunately, White's book lacks a solid conclusion. The 
reader does not know what to do with White's assertions. One com-
mentator who argues, as does White, of the continuing arbitrariness of 
the death penalty declares that, " 'guided discretion' is not working 
and, perhaps, cannot work. If this is correct and if the argument from 
arbitrariness is accepted, then it would appear that a return from 
Gregg to Furman is required. That is, the Court should once again 
condemn capital punishment as unconstitutional."23 The reader of 
White's book can only infer such a conclusion. White's book would 
19. MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981). 
20. See, e.g., William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Dete"ence or Brutalization: What Is the 
Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453 (1980). 
21. White's theme of the Supreme Court's current emphasis on expediting executions has 
been discussed by other commentators such as Streib, supra note 15, at 484. White's theme of 
the death penalty's continuing arbitrary application has been discussed by other commentators 
such as BLACK, supra note 5; William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimi-
nation under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELJNQ. 563 (1980); Nathanson, supra 
note 10. 
22. In chapter 5, for example, White discusses his own interpretation of Supreme Court cases 
as to what a defendant can present as mitigating evidence at the death penalty trial. 
23. Nathanson, supra note 10, at 150. 
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have a more powerful effect on the reader if White had linked all his 
different assertions together to form one grand conclusion. 
- Thomas L. Shaevsky 
